[Previous entries: Dworkin's nonsense on stilts; Letter to the Guardian; Dworkin nonsense; Not Dworkin to me] [His name is a boon for headline writers]
Two months ago, I started trying to wring a correction out of the Guardian, after one of their occasional columnists, Ronald Dworkin, claimed that Jeremy Bentham had viewed the 'whole idea of human rights' as "nonsense upon stilts". (Dworkin is the Bentham professor of jurisprudence at UCL.) For weeks, the Corrections office blanked me. Last week I tried again, this time threatening Ian Mayes that, if I still got no reply, I'd write to the editor, the external ombudsman, the Scott trustees and UCL.
Two days later, Mayes' assistant wrote back to me with Dworkin's reply. Dworkin wrote thus:
I said that Bentham condemned human rights as nonsense on stilts because I was criticizing Simon Jenkins in the Sunday Times who said, "Bentham was correct. There are no fundamental human rights. The concept, said the great utilitarian, is 'nonsense on stilts'." Your reader objects, to me and therefore to Jenkins, that Bentham spoke of natural rights not human rights. But your reader is making the mistake of conflating words and ideas. Both phrases refer to the same idea. He is guilty of another confusion in saying that human rights did not exist when Bentham wrote. He must mean that the term "human rights" was not in general use then, which is a different matter. If human rights exist now, they have existed for as long as there have been human beings, or at least human beings in political society. He makes a different claim about utilitarianism. Whether human rights exist or not is a matter of the ontology of value not value-free ontology. If Bentham's utilitarianism is correct then there cannot be rights and, as he said, particularly not natural or human rights. If Bentham's utilitarianism is wrong, his "nonsense" claim must be wrong, for reasons Kant pointed out.
Under the fold, I've included the full text of my reply to Dworkin. It was a poor reply, which missed the mark. I tried to answer each of the points he raised, but It was the wrong strategy, and the Guardian found in his favour. But this was my response to his last sentence, in which he had cited Kant.
If Bentham's utilitarianism is wrong, his "nonsense" claim must be wrong, for reasons Kant pointed out.
Would Professor Dworkin please provide a citation for this? When I first read this sentence, it seemed decisively impressive. But then I remembered that Bentham's Anarchical Fallacies, wherein he wrote of inalienable rights as 'nonsense upon stilts', was not, to my limited knowledge, published until around the year of his death, 1832. And Immanuel Kant died in 1804. So, how could Kant have pointed out the falsity of Bentham's 'nonsense' claim? This would therefore appear to be another of RD's anachronistic attributions, but I'd appreciate a citation if one exists. (And if RD is in touch with a medium who's in contact with dead philosophers who will share their thoughts on things post their mortem, could you ask him to ask the medium to ask Thomas Hobbes what he thinks of the United States, especially from its civil war to the present day - thanks.)
I doubt I'll hear back from Dworkin, so if anyone reading this knows their Kant or Bentham, could you please tell me where Kant addressed Bentham's utilitarianism and natural rights? Is Dworkin right, or is he making it up as he goes along, trying to sound impressive but, like the rest of us, full of **it?
Mayes' assistant wrote back the next day.
Your questions and comments deal with matters of opinion and interpretation which are outside the remit of the Readers' editor. We have passed Professor Dworkin's reply to you, and although we cannot speak for him, he is unlikely to want to continue the debate. May I suggest you send a short, and as succinct as possible (300 words), letter for publication for consideration by the Letters editor ([email protected]). Otherwise, there is nothing to stop you writing to Professor Dworkin at University College London. I'm sorry we cannot help further
best wishes Helen
That reply left me livid, partly because it signalled my failure. I've lost much confidence in the Guardian reader's editor as a neutral arbiter. I might try emailing Dworkin to see if I can get the Kant citation off him. Whatever, this episode has left me unsatisfied.
This was my reply to Dworkin:
Dear Helen
Thank you for attending to this. I'm grateful to Professor Dworkin (hereafter, RD) for replying. But I remain un-persuaded that 'natural rights', 'inalienable rights' and 'human rights' are identical terms that can be used interchangeably, so I still dispute his assertion that Bentham had a view on the 'whole idea of human rights'. Here are my responses to the points your columnist raises in defence of his phraseology of May 24, 2006.
I said that Bentham condemned human rights as nonsense on stilts
The words RD actually used were "nonsense upon stilts". (See below for why this has significance.)
because I was criticizing Simon Jenkins in the Sunday Times who said, "Bentham was correct. There are no fundamental human rights. The concept, said the great utilitarian, is 'nonsense on stilts'."
Note that Jenkins slightly misquoted Bentham's famous phrase. But this is what RD actually wrote about Jenkins:
Simon Jenkins, in the Sunday Times, recently declared his enthusiasm for the 18th-century philosopher Jeremy Bentham who said that all that matters is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and that the whole idea of human rights is therefore "nonsense upon stilts".
I dispute the idea that RD's phraseology was determined by his criticism of Simon Jenkins (which is the Jenkins-made-me-do-it defence). In the quoted passage, he reports that Jenkins had written about Bentham, but then RD gives his own précis of Bentham on rights (from "... Bentham[,] who said that..", onwards). His final quote is from Bentham, not from Jenkins. These are RD's words about Bentham; they are not words criticizing Jenkins, that are determining RD's own choice of words.
Your reader objects, to me and therefore to Jenkins, that Bentham spoke of natural rights not human rights.
Not exactly - I object to the two phrases being used interchangeably by modern commentators, if confusion is thereby caused, and insist that academics and Guardian columnists don't make the same mistake.
I did read Jenkins's piece, online when it was published, with its arresting first paragraph. But, as I read on, I realized that SJ, whom I esteem as a journalist, was not a philosopher of rights. But his linkage of Bentham with human rights was less problematic that RD's later useage. Jenkins began in the past tense with Bentham, whom most readers would have known as an 18/19thC philosopher, and he qualified the words 'human rights' with 'fundamental', and then used the word 'concept'. Only then did he address present-day British issues.
RD's piece, however, starts in the present tense in Britain, goes on to a defence of the idea of human rights in modern society, and then, via Jenkins's article, (mis)uses Bentham negatively to argue that Britain has long embraced the ideology of human rights and should therefore hold strongly to the HRA and the ECHR. Thus, RD clearly used 'human rights' in its modern sense, whereas Jenkins, in his first paragraph, clearly did not.
Also, RD's phrase, 'the whole idea of', is less acceptable than Jenkins's use of 'concept' - the whole idea of human rights, as RD's article makes clear, involves declarations, conventions, constitutions, acts of parliament, courts, lawyers, etc; whereas, Jenkins's 'concept of fundamental human rights' does not. So, I object to RD's phraseology, not Jenkins's.
But your reader is making the mistake of conflating words and ideas.
I am? Whereas, I think it's your columnist who makes the mistake of de-coupling certain words and phrases from the ideas and facts that they are normally understood to signify.
Both phrases refer to the same idea.
No, they do not. They refer to linked-but-distinct ideas (see my previous emails). We need both phrases, nowadays, to distinguish between, on the one hand, the pre-20thC theorizing about natural and inalienable rights (especially of the 17th and 18th centuries) and, on the other hand, their 20thC codification into international and, later, European and UK domestic law. Both phrases refer to the idea of inalienable rights, yes, but they each imply other ideas as well, which makes them distinct.
He is guilty of another confusion in saying that human rights did not exist when Bentham wrote. He must mean that the term "human rights" was not in general use then, which is a different matter.
No, I'm distinguishing between natural and human rights, with the latter now normally signifying the former's contemporary elaoboration, realization and implementation. I did not, as suggested, discuss the currency of the term 'human rights' in Bentham's day - RD should read all of my emails to you, if he hasn't already, if he is confused about the details of my complaint.
If human rights exist now, they have existed for as long as there have been human beings, or at least human beings in political society.
I believe RD should better distinguish between the concepts of natural rights, inalienable rights, and human rights, rather than conflate them or use them interchangeably, as he tends to. The above sentence above would, I submit, be better served by using 'inalienable rights' instead. RD's belief in the reality of inalienable rights (which are presumably imputed to us by our Creator), while being admirably well intentioned, does not help justify his claim that Bentham had a view on human rights.
He makes a different claim about utilitarianism. Whether human rights exist or not is a matter of the ontology of value not value-free ontology.
Huh? (I understand the terms but not the meaning. I guess that's why he's the professor and I'm not.)
If Bentham's utilitarianism is correct then there cannot be rights and, as he said, particularly not natural or human rights.
Not so. Bentham's utilitarianism sought to give people as many political, legal and social rights as possible. But, in Anarchical Fallacies, he was highly critical of the ideology of inalienable rights (such as the right to liberty, the right to security, and so on). He thought that the latter type, which he saw as aspirational rather than realistic, serve only to undermine the former and were thus anti-utilitarian, i.e., contrary to the common good.
If Bentham's utilitarianism is wrong, his "nonsense" claim must be wrong, for reasons Kant pointed out.
Would Professor Dworkin please provide a citation for this? When I first read this sentence, it seemed decisively impressive. But then I remembered that Bentham's Anarchical Fallacies, wherein he wrote of inalienable rights as 'nonsense upon stilts', was not, to my limited knowledge, published until around the year of his death, 1832. And Immanuel Kant died in 1804. So, how could Kant have pointed out the falsity of Bentham's 'nonsense' claim? This would therefore appear to be another of RD's anachronistic attributions, but I'd appreciate a citation if one exists. (And if RD is in touch with a medium who's in contact with dead philosophers who will share their thoughts on things post their mortem, could you ask him to ask the medium to ask Thomas Hobbes what he thinks of the United States, especially from its civil war to the present day - thanks.)
I rest my case. It's now for you the jury, the Readers' Editor crew, to decide. I think his reply failed to justify his statement that Bentham had a view on 'the whole idea of human rights', as I've tried to show, and so my request for a correction or clarification still stands. But I expect that you will decide in his favour, for reasons of realpolitik, and I will understand that. But could you please at least inform me of your decision, when you make it?
Sincerely,
[Shaphan's real name]
PS I have a blog, http://shaphan.typepad.com/blog/, which I only update occasionally and is rarely read by anybody. I've mentioned this matter in several previous posts and have quoted from my emails to your office. I intend quoting this one too, in its entirety, so as to complete the story. If Professor Dworkin objects to this, please let me know.
----- Original Message -----
Comments